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Mechanism design models typically conclude by characterizing an optimal alloca-
tion schedule based on the principal’s beliefs regarding agent value functions and the
distribution of agent types. This article addresses the question of how a principal can
develop these beliefs given a standard cross-sectional data set in which agents’ input-
output choices are observable, but their underlying heterogeneity is not. I employ the
methodology to evaluate strategies for reducing the cost of a voluntary program that
reduces cultivation on environmentally-sensitive farmland.
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This article deals with an adverse selection problem of the general class considered by
Baron and Myerson (1982). Agents have private information regarding a “type” parameter.
The uninformed principal acts as a Stackelberg leader, designing the best contract possible,
given the information asymmetry. There is a rich theoretical literature extending this basic
model. Typically the precise terms of an optimal contract schedule depend on the principal’s
prior beliefs regarding the probability distribution of types and the manner in which type
aﬀects agents’ reservation utility. What is lacking in the literature is an easily implemented
methodology by which the principal can develop robust beliefs regarding these two items
with data that do not include agents’ private information. This article develops such a
methodology and applies it to the problem of reducing the cost of one of the United States’
largest environmental policies, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). Administered by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), this program pays agricultural producers to
refrain from cultivating environmentally-sensitive cropland. The CRP is one of the largest
environmental programs in the U.S., both in terms of budget ($1.7 billion per year) and
scope (34.7 million acres) (Farm Service Agency, 2005b).
The key econometric problem is estimating the parameters of the type-dependent
production technology and the probability distribution of agent types when type is inherently
unobservable both to the principal and the econometrician. One branch of the empirical con-
tract theory literature, such as Wolak (1994), Thomas (1995), and Lavergne and Thomas
(2005) conducts estimation under the hypothesis that existing contracts are optimally de-
signed by a sophisticated principal. The authors ﬁrst derive an optimal mechanism. This
analysis provides equations that can be econometrically estimated with observable data to
infer the principal’s beliefs regarding the distribution of types and the impact of type on the
1agent. By its nature, this line of research is descriptive rather than prescriptive. It allows
the econometrician to infer the principal’s beliefs, but provides no guidance to the principal
regarding how to develop them.
A second branch deals with how to estimate parameters of a contracting model
without assuming a sophisticated principal. Work in this area has used the contracting
framework of Laﬀont and Tirole (1986), focusing on heavily regulated industries such as
urban transport where existing regulations create moral hazard problems in addition to
adverse selection. In an initial attempt along this line, Dalen and G´ omez-Lobo (1997)
interpreted regression residuals as an indication of the type of an individual agent. That
model was rather restrictive since it did not allow for any random error. In their study
of French urban transport ﬁrms, Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) employ a similar approach,
assuming that labor eﬃciency (type in their model) is an unobserved time-invariant random
variable with a beta distribution. Importantly, they also append a normally-distributed
random error. With panel data, they are able to use maximum likelihood techniques to
estimate the parameters of ﬁrms’ cost functions as well as the parameters of the distribution
of agent types.
Like Gagnepain and Ivaldi, the estimation strategy employed here allows for a ran-
dom distribution of agent types as well as a stochastic noise. Rather than analyzing a
regulated monopoly, it analyzes a sector in which all production decisions are chosen by the
agents themselves.1 As a result, diﬀerences in regulatory framework (e.g., cost-plus versus
ﬁxed price) do not aﬀect agent actions. In addition, output cannot be considered exogenous.
The key diﬀerence, however, lies in econometric methodology. In the spirit of the
stochastic frontier models pioneered by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977),
the speciﬁcation employed here allows use of a two-part additive composite error structure.
2One part is stochastic noise. The second part is a strictly positive type variable. This ap-
proach estimates the parameters of a cost frontier. Intuitively, observed deviations from
the frontier can occur for two reasons. Random estimation errors can place an observation
either above or below the frontier. Agent type can only place an observation above the fron-
tier, since a less eﬀective ﬁrm can only perform worse than the best, i.e., have higher than
minimum cost. Generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques are used to identify
the parameters of each of the distributions of the composite error as well as the techno-
logical parameters.2 This methodology has several advantages over earlier approaches: it
easily accommodates robust covariance matrix estimation, allows estimation of a full sys-
tem including expenditure share equations, is consistent with proﬁt-maximizing behavior, is
implementable with cross-sectional data, and is computationally undemanding.
As an illustration, I evaluate alternatives for reducing the cost of the CRP. From
its inception in 1985, there have been concerns that asymmetric information regarding pro-
ducers’ reservation values for idled land could inﬂate the cost of the program. In an eﬀort
to overcome information problems, the program uses an auction format. Producers submit
bids on the rental value they are willing to accept in order to idle an eligible parcel of land.
Initially, the USDA accepted almost all bids that were below a maximum per acre rental
rate, or bid cap, set at a regional level. Producers soon learned the cap for their region and
bids converged to that level (Smith, 1995).
In practice, the CRP thus functioned more like a per-acre Pigouvian subsidy than
an auction. As a result, farmers with relatively unproductive land received surplus pay-
ments above their reservation values. One strategy for reducing these surplus payments is
to redesign the allocation mechanism itself so it does a better job of minimizing the cost of
attaining its objective, given the information asymmetry. Another is to gather data to re-
3duce the degree of hidden information. Over the years, program administrators have chosen
the latter course. The USDA uses soil maps and local land rents to establish county-level
bid caps rather than the previous regional ones.
I calculate potential savings to taxpayers from these two policy alternatives. First,
I evaluate the cost reduction from changing the bidding process so that it functions as a
second-best mechanism rather than a Pigouvian subsidy. Second, I obtain an indication of
the usefulness of eﬀorts undertaken by the government to overcome information asymmetries
by comparing the cost of the ﬁrst-best (full information) mechanism to the second-best
mechanism.
In Section II, I describe and implement the econometric strategy for developing
consistent beliefs regarding the production technology and distribution of agent types when
agent heterogeneity is unobservable. In Section III, I characterize the theoretical least-cost
land set aside program. In Section IV, I use this information to simulate policy alternatives
for reducing the cost of the CRP.3 Section V contains concluding comments.
II. Empirical Model
A. Speciﬁcation
Producers are characterized by two exogenously ﬁxed factors, one observable and
one not. The observed ﬁxed factor is acres of land, denoted a ∈ <++. The unobserved
factor is a type productivity index θ ∈ Θ ≡ (0,1]. Let x ∈ <N
+ denote the variable-
input vector and q ∈ <+ denote aggregate output. The variable-input requirement set
is V (q,a,θ) ≡ {x : x can produce q given a,θ}. In addition to V (q,a,θ)b e i n gac l o s e d ,
convex set, it is assumed to satisfy the following properties:
4V1. x ∈ V (q,a,θ) ⇒ λx ∈ V (q,a,θ),λ≥ 1 (weak disposability of inputs);
V2. V (q,a,λθ)=λ
−1V (q,a,θ),λ>0 (type is neutrally input augmenting).
Property V1 indicates that inputs can expand along a ray from the origin without
reducing feasible output. Property V2 speciﬁes the eﬀect of θ on production. An increase in
type implies a proportional radial expansion of V (q,a,θ). For example, referring to Figure
1, if θ2 is twice θ1, it can produce the same output with half of each variable input, given
a. Together with V1, V2 implies that a producer can do no worse than a lower type since
for any given q its set of feasible input bundles completely includes the set of feasible input
bundles of all lower types.
For a vector of variable input prices w ∈ <N
++ the minimum variable cost function
is C (w,q,a,θ) ≡ infx {w0x : x ∈ V (q,a,θ)}. It follows from V2 that a proportional change
in type by a factor λ>0 implies that the minimum cost of producing q with a changes by
a factor of λ
−1.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
lnC (w,q,a,θ)=l nC (w,q,a,1) − lnθ, (1)
where C (w,q,a,1) is the cost frontier; i.e., the minimal cost function across all types. For








,n =1 ,...,N, (2)
where xn
∗ is the cost minimizing level of input n. Note that a further consequence of V2 is
that these expenditure shares do not vary across types.
For a given output price p ∈ <++,t h ev a r i a b l ep r o ﬁtf u n c t i o ni sπ(p,w,a,θ) ≡
5supq {pq − C (w,q,a,θ)}.L e tq∗ be the proﬁt-maximizing output quantity. Algebraic ma-
nipulation of the ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution to the proﬁt maximization







Like expenditure shares (2), the ratio (3) is independent of θ.
Following Diewert (1982), Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) provide the basis for estimating
a parametric technology for proﬁt-maximizing producers. For the cost function, I use a















βn ln ˜ wn + βq lnq
∗ + βa lna + βaa (lna)




= βn + vn ,n =1 ,...,N − 1( 6 )
pq∗
C (w,q∗,a,θ)
= βq + vN , (7)
where e w ≡ (˜ w1,..., ˜ wN)
0 ≡ (w1/wN,...,wN/wN)
0 is the vector of input prices normalized by
wN and C (e w,q∗,a,θ)=C (w,q ∗,a,θ)/wN by the linear homogeneity of the cost function
in input prices. The vector of stochastic noise for producer s is vs≡(v0,v 1,...,vN)
0.
Since output is endogenous under the assumption of proﬁt maximization, in estima-
tion output price p acts as an instrument for q∗.L e tzs ≡ (lna,lna2,ln e w0,lnp)
0 denote the
6vector of exogenous variables for producer s.
Due to the information asymmetry, θ is inherently unobservable to the government
and the econometrician. Following the stochastic frontier approach, I treat lnθ as a random









(lnθ − E [lnθ])
3¤
= σ3 (1 − 4/π)
p
2/π.
Under M1, the vector vs has a mean-zero disturbance vector uncorrelated with
the instruments. In addition, M2 states that the disturbance for Eq. (5) is symmetrically
distributed. Assumptions M3 and M4 require that lnθ be uncorrelated with the instruments,
and that its mean and skewness correspond to those of −|y|,w h e r ey is a random variable
distributed N (0,σ 2).
As noted by Aigner et al. (1977), these distributional assumptions have two practical
implications. First, consider a least squares estimator that ignores the type-dependent com-
ponent of the error structure, mistakenly using the moment conditions E [v0 − lnθ|zs]=0 .
By treating the expected compound error as mean zero, rather than mean σ
p
2/π,t h i s
























Such an estimator generates consistent estimates of all parameters in the cost function except
β0, which is upwardly biased by σ
p
2/π. The second practical implication is that the
7compound error term (v0 − lnθ) is positively skewed with third central moment equal to
−σ3 (1 − 4/π)
p
2/π.
Let e ≡ (e1,...,eS)
0 denote the residuals for Eq. (8) of a regression of the system
comprising Eqs. (6)-(8). The third moment of the residuals is a consistent estimator for the
third moment of the combined error term. This suggests an additional equation that can be




3 (1 − 4/π)
p
2/π + vN+1, (9)
where vN+1 is random noise. The estimate ˆ σ
3 c a nt h e nb eu s e dt oc o r r e c tt h ei n i t i a lb i a si n
β0. Adapting Newey (1984), one can employ the residuals from Eqs. (6)-(8) to compute the
asymptotic covariance matrix for the entire system.
Using these results, estimation of the system proceeds in three steps. In the ﬁrst
step, I ignore lnθ, and estimate Eqs. (6)-(8) by system two-stage least squares (2SLS). This
procedure generates consistent estimates of all parameters, except β0. Although otherwise
consistent, the 2SLS estimator is likely to be ineﬃcient and generate inconsistent estimates
of the covariance matrix. In addition to correlation of errors for the same observation across
equations, the noise component may be heteroskedastic or inﬂuenced by unobserved shocks
commonly aﬀecting all producers in the same geographic area. Such shocks may be short-
lived or persist across time.
I account for these potential problems in the next step. Following Pepper (2002),
Wooldridge (2002), and Wooldridge (2003), the 2SLS residuals are used to construct a more
robust GMM estimator. This estimator is asymptotically eﬃcient in the presence of ar-
bitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary county-level correlations both within and between
time periods. Finally, the third moment of the GMM residuals from Eq. (8) provide the
8necessary information to obtain consistent estimates of σ, β0, and the covariance matrix.
B. Data and Estimation Results
Producer cost and returns data come from 1997-2000 Agricultural Resource Man-
agement Study (ARMS) surveys conducted by the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics
Service (NASS). The surveys are independent annual cross-sections in which it is not possi-
ble to identify individual producers across time. They collect producer-level data on input
expenditures, output quantities, and land. Disaggregated input and output price data come
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for capital and labor, the Federal Reserve for interest
rates and NASS for other inputs and crop and livestock outputs.
I aggregate outputs into a single category and variable inputs into capital services,
energy, materials, labor using a multilateral Tornqvist index (see Caves et al., 1982).4 Since
ARMS surveys record capital assets as estimated market value at year end, I calculate
capital services adapting the methodology of Hall and Jorgenson (1969). Table 1 contains
the summary statistics for the data set.
Since the estimation procedure implicitly assumes all producers have the same gen-
eral production technology (up to the type parameter), I focus attention on one relatively
homogenous area, the “Heartland” Farm Resource Region.5 This region comprises the entire
states of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, as well as portions of Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota. It is the region with most farms, most cropland, and
greatest value of production (Economic Research Service, 2000).
To control for systemic production shocks such as weather and technological change
that aﬀe c tt h ew h o l er e g i o ni nag i v e ny e a r ,Ir e p l a c et h ec o n s t a n ti nE q .( 5 )w i t ha na n n u a l
dummy vector d ≡ (d1997,...,d2000)
0,a n dβ0 with the parameter vector δ ≡ (δ1997,...,δ2000)
0.
9Table 2 reports the estimation results.
















































For the parameter estimates in Table 2, marginal returns to land are increasing until
about 400 acres, after which the proﬁt function is strictly concave in land cultivated. The
marginal proﬁt from land is positive for all farms less than 6,350 acres. The marginal eﬀect
of type on proﬁt is positive, and the single-crossing condition πaθ > 0i ss a t i s ﬁed for all farms
for which the marginal return to land is positive. In addition, this proﬁt function satisﬁes
theoretical monotonicity and curvature conditions with respect to prices.
Although model speciﬁcations and data sets diﬀer, input own-price elasticities are
comparable to results from earlier studies of U.S. agriculture such as Ray (1982). The
expected farm size for any randomly chosen acre of land in the sample is approximately
2,000 acres. The estimated average annual return to land for the typical 2,000 acre farm over
the four years is approximately $33 per acre. When combined with lump-sum government
payments of about $54 per enrolled acre, this ﬁgure is reasonably close to average farmland
rental rates for the region of $91.6
As we shall see in the next section, empirical characterization of the optimal con-
tract schedule requires two components: a proﬁt function for each type of producer and a
probability distribution for type. The procedures described in this section provide precisely
10this information. The estimated technological parameters of the cost function can be used
to generate a parametric proﬁt function for each type. In addition, the estimate ˆ σθ can be
used to obtain a probability density function of producer types.
III. Alternative Environmental Contracts
The environmental policies examined here are three stylized versions of the CRP. In
all three versions, the program has two salient features. First, the government must ensure
that the sector idles a targeted quantity of land. Second, the program must be voluntary.7
The task of the government is to design a policy mechanism for allocating land and transfer
payments such that these conditions are satisﬁed at least cost to taxpayers.
The three versions of the program diﬀer in additional constraints faced by the gov-
ernment. In the least constrained “ﬁrst-best” case, the government has full information
regarding producer types, and can directly use this information to design contracts. In the
“second-best” case, the government cannot observe type, but can oﬀer producers diﬀerent
per-acre payments depending on the quantity of land enrolled in the program. In the ﬁnal
“Pigouvian subsidy” case, the government cannot observe type nor can it price discriminate
among producers. Instead, it can only oﬀer a linear payment per unit of land retired. The
diﬀerence in cost between the ﬁrst and second best programs provides an upper bound on
the value of actions designed to overcome the information asymmetry. The diﬀerence be-
tween the second best and Pigouvian programs indicates the maximum beneﬁts obtainable
by redesigning the program itself, without obtaining new information.
The variables a(θ)a n dt(θ) denote the terms of a contract for type θ,w h e r ea(θ)
is the amount of land cultivated and t(θ) is the transfer. Suppressing price arguments, the
market proﬁt function π(a(θ),θ), completely characterizes the production technology. All
11producers are assumed to be equally endowed with an initial acreage allocation a equal to
2,000 acres. This maximum farm size is assumed to be ﬁxed in the short run. I also assume
that for reasons of overall eﬃciency the government does not wish farmers to produce in the
range of increasing returns to land. Therefore the minimum amount of land cultivated, a,
is 500 acres.8 These restrictions ensure that the proﬁt function satisﬁes πa > 0,π aa < 0
and πaθ > 0 over the relevant range of a. Consistent with the previous sections, assume
the probability density function of types, f (θ) ≡ dF (θ)/dθ,i ss u c ht h a tl nθ has a normal
distribution truncated at zero from above.
Assuming all farmland is eligible for participation, the environmental constraint is a
requirement that the average quantity of land idled across all producers be at least A acres:
Z
Θ
[a − a(θ)]dF (θ) ≥ A (12)
To ensure that program participation is voluntary, producers must be compensated for the
opportunity cost of idled land:
π(a(θ),θ)+t(θ) ≥ π(a,θ), for all θ. (13)
Deﬁne surplus payments received by a ﬁrm in excess of the minimum necessary to
satisfy (13) by:
s(θ) ≡ π(a(θ),θ)+t(θ) − π(a,θ). (14)
The participation constraint (13) can then be expressed more succinctly by:
s(θ) ≥ 0, for all θ. (15)




{s(θ) − π(a(θ),θ)+π(a,θ)}dF (θ). (16)
Finally, let λ ≥ 0a n dµ(θ) ≥ 0 respectively denote the Lagrange multipliers for (12) and
the restriction a(θ) ≤ a.
The ﬁrst-best program chooses s(θ)a n da(θ) to minimize Eq. (16), subject to (12),













At the optimum s(θ) is clearly set equal to zero for all types. In addition to the constraints












=0 ; ( 1 9 )
a(θ)[a − a(θ)] = 0; λ
Z
Θ
{[a − a(θ)] − A}dF (θ)=0 . (20)
Consequently, for an interior solution, the optimal ﬁrst-best program satisﬁes the equimarginal
principle. It equates the marginal proﬁt from cultivating an additional acre of land for each
producer to the shadow cost of tightening the environmental constraint for the entire sector.
With full information, the ﬁrst-best program could be implemented by oﬀering a uniform
price for idled land equal to λ, combined with a type-dependent lump-sum tax that recovers
each producer’s surplus.
13The optimal second-best policy is slightly more complicated. Without loss of general-
ity, I appeal to the Revelation Principle and restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms






















This requirement, combined with the participation constraint (15), imposes two restrictions
on the set of feasible contract allocations (both follow directly from results in Baron and
Myerson (1982)). First, for an interior solution, a truthful mechanism requires that land use
be monotonically non-decreasing in type:
a
0 (θ) ≥ 0. (22)
Second, a truthful mechanism requires the change in expected surplus over type be decreasing
at the rate
s
0(θ)=πθ (a(θ),θ) − πθ (a,θ). (23)
Since surplus is decreasing, the best the principal can do while satisfying (15) and
(23) is to set s
¡¯ θ
¢




πθ (a(ω),ω) − πθ (a,ω)dω. (24)
Temporarily ignoring (22), substitution of Eq. (24) into Eq. (16) and integrating by parts








[πθ (a,θ) − πθ (a(θ),θ)] − π(a(θ),θ)+π(a,θ)
¾




















=0 ; ( 2 7 )
µ(θ)[a − a(θ)] = 0; λ
Z
Θ
{[a − a(θ)] − A}dF (θ) = 0; (28)
The properties of F (θ)a n dπ(a(θ),θ) ensure that this solution satisﬁes (22) (see Guesnerie
and Laﬀont, 1984). The impact of asymmetric information can be easily seen for interior
solutions. Unlike the ﬁrst-best case, rather than having the marginal proﬁto fl a n db e
equated for all farms, there is a distortion created by the term F (θ)πaθ/f (θ). As a result,
the equimarginal principal is never satisﬁed. This program could be implemented by the
government requesting that producers choose a land allocation and total transfer payment
from a menu of possible choices. For an interior solution, such a scheme would not result in
al i n e a rp r i c ep e ra c r eo fl a n di d l e d .
The Pigouvian subsidy program can be thought of as a hybrid of the ﬁrst and second
best programs. With this program, the transfer is ta(θ)r a t h e rt h a nt(θ). The ﬁrst order
condition of incentive compatibility condition (21) requires that an interior solution satisfy:
πa (a(θ),θ)=t. (29)
15Therefore, like the ﬁrst-best program, for an interior solution the Pigouvian land allocation
scheme equates marginal proﬁt of land across producers. Moreover, in order to satisfy the
environmental constraint (12), this land allocation must be exactly the same as for the
ﬁrst-best program. It is like the second-best program, however, in the sense that Eq. (23)
must still be satisﬁed. With asymmetric information, the government cannot recover surplus
payments from producers. The best it can do is ensure that the highest participating type
receives zero surplus.
IV. Policy Simulations
Using the structural parameters estimated in Section II and the theoretical results
from Section III, one can empirically characterize the three programs in terms of amount
of land idled and transfer received by each type. In this section, I conduct simulations to
evaluate two policy decisions. The ﬁrst is the value of removing the information asymmetry.
Suppose type were completely embodied in a measurable soil quality index. By comparing
the cost of the ﬁrst and second best mechanisms, we obtain the maximum amount the
government should be willing to pay to collect the soil quality information. The second
policy decision involves the value of policy reform. Revising policy inherently involves some
degree of transition cost. By comparing the second-best program with the optimal linear-
price program mechanism, we obtain the maximum amount the government should be willing
to incur to develop an optimal policy without collecting additional information.
For purposes of the simulation, the proﬁt function is deﬁned as the average of π(a,θ)
given prices of the four year period 1997-2000. Since about 5 percent of cropland in the
Heartland region participates in the CRP, the expected land set aside target A is set to
100 acres for the 2,000-acre farms.9 The lower bound of lnθ with a half-normal distribution
16function is −∞. To make the model tractable, I truncate the distribution from below at -1,
thereby excluding roughly one percent of farms. The remaining farm types are assumed to
be distributed with a mean-zero log-normal distribution truncated from above by zero and
below by -1. The variable lnθ is measured with a precision of 0.001. For each program, the
numerical solution of the relevant necessary conditions characterizes the contract terms.
Figure 2 depicts the contract terms for the three programs. For all programs the
majority of producer types fall into a corner solution. For the ﬁrst-best and Pigouvian
programs, the highest 88.6 percent of types do not participate, and the lowest 3.4 percent of
types enroll the maximum amount of land. For the second-best program more types fall into
both corner solutions with the corresponding ﬁg u r e so f8 9 . 8a n d4 . 2p e r c e n tr e s p e c t i v e l y .T h e
distortion in the land allocation caused by the information asymmetry is clearly visible in
panel (a). By Eq. (24) total surplus payments decrease as the lowest non-participating type
decreases. Consequently, relative to the ﬁrst best the second-best program shifts enrolled
acres away from higher types towards lower types.
Panel (b) shows that the cost diﬀerence caused by the information asymmetry is
large compared to that of using the sub-optimal Pigouvian program. As shown in panels
(b) and (c) the choice between the second best and Pigouvian pricing mechanisms also
has implications for income distribution within the agricultural sector. The second-best
mechanism reduces total surplus payments made to the sector, relative to a linear subsidy.
This reduction in surplus comes exclusively at the expense of the more proﬁtable farms.
Relatively less proﬁtable producers (those with a type lower than e−0.8) would actually
beneﬁt from a policy switch from a Pigouvian to the second-best mechanism.
Assuming 58,000 farms (in 1997 there were approximately 116 million acres of crop-
land in the Heartland region), the total costs of the ﬁrst-best, second-best, and Pigouvian
17programs are $24.098, $38.489, and $38.547 million. Gains from policy reform are small,
averaging about one penny per acre enrolled. Eﬀorts undertaken to eliminate information
asymmetry could be much more valuable, achieving at most a 37.5 percent reduction in total
program costs relative to the second best.
V. Conclusion
Several recent articles have shown the usefulness of stochastic frontier techniques
for analysis of regulation under asymmetric information. Here, I extend earlier results in
two directions. First, I develop a GMM-based methodology for estimating a stochastic cost
frontier for a proﬁt-maximizing producer. This approach diﬀers from earlier GMM and ML
frontier techniques in that it accommodates multiple equations (in this case a cost equation,
expenditure share equations, and the ratio of revenue to cost) and is robust to arbitrary
cross-equation correlation, heteroskedasticity, and geographic clustering. Further, it is easy
to estimate as it does not require non-linear optimization.
Second, I extend the empirical contract theory literature by using stochastic frontier
analysis to estimate the technology of a heterogeneous sample of producers in an unreg-
ulated sector. Although the econometrician cannot directly observe producer type, this
approach permits estimation of the probability distribution of types in the population. This
information provides the necessary material for empirically specifying an optimal contract
m e c h a n i s mi nt h eB a r o na n dM y e r s o nf r a m e w o r k .
Application of this methodology to a simulated model of a voluntary environmental
program for land retirement in the agricultural sector yields some interesting results. The
simulation permits comparison of an optimal second best mechanism to the optimal full
information mechanism and a sub-optimal Pigouvian subsidy mechanism. In reality, actual
18policy is a mix of the three. Producer types are unobservable, but the government uses soil
maps and county average land rents to proxy for type. The policy is nominally structured
as an auction in order to induce producers to reveal the true opportunity cost of their land.
In practice, however, the program is similar to a Pigouvian subsidy since most producers bid
at or near the maximum permissible rental rate.
By examining three “pure” hypothetical programs, the analysis conducted here pro-
vides guidance to policy makers interested in reducing the cost of the environmental policy.
For example, if the second-best program closely approximates the full information program,
eﬀorts may be better spent redesigning the program to make it function more like a true
auction rather than gathering detailed soil data and developing agronomic/economic models
linking soil type to overall proﬁt. The results of the exercise indicate the contrary, however.
The second-best mechanism performs only slightly better than a linear Pigouvian subsidy.
Even absent any transition costs, the savings from perfecting the program (given that type
is unobservable) are in the order of one penny per acre. More signiﬁcant cost reductions can
only be obtained by gathering data to overcome the information asymmetry.
Notes
1Although agriculture may not leap to mind as an unregulated proﬁt-maximizing sector,
since 1996 government payments have largely been independent of farm production decisions.
2Kopp and Mullahy (1990) was the ﬁrst to use GMM techniques to estimate a cost
frontier. Kleit and Terrell (2001) and Knittel (2002) have used stochastic frontier analysis
to infer the impact of regulatory framework on costs in the electricity sector.
3All computations in Sections II and IV were programmed in Gauss 5.0.
4Disaggregated outputs include barley, canola, cotton, fruit, hay, oats, potatoes, rice,
19sorghum, soybeans, sugar beets, tobacco, vegetables, wheat, cattle, dairy, eggs, hogs, and
poultry. Capital includes farm machinery and vehicles. Labor includes both farm household
and hired labor. Energy inputs are diesel, gasoline, liquid propane gas, and electricity.
The materials category consists of seed, fertilizer, chemicals, supplies, feed, livestock inputs,
poultry inputs, custom work, and repairs.
5The USDA Economic Research Service divides the country into “Farm Resource Re-
gions” with similar physiographic, soil, and climatic characteristics.
6Data on government payments, acreage enrollment, and rental rates come from Envi-
ronmental Working Group (2005), Farm Service Agency (2005a), and National Agricultural
Statistics Service (2001), respectively.
7For more complex model incorporating additional aspects of the program, see Smith
(1995).
8The actual CRP has a cap limiting enrollment to 25 percent of farmland in any county.
9Information on regional cropland and CRP participation comes from Vesterby (2002)
and Economic Research Service (2003).
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Number of observations 5,528








ln Capital Price 0.3906 0.0024***
ln Labor Price 0.1652 0.0043***
ln Energy Price 0.0443 0.0029***
ln Materials Price 0.3999 0.0026***
ln Output 1.2021 0.0024***
ln Acres -0.8756 0.1374***
ln Acres squared 0.0500 0.0105***
σ 0.4274 0.3228*
Notes: The ﬁrst four variables are year dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for county clustering and
and heteroskedasticity.
***Signiﬁcantly greater than zero at 1-percent level.
*Signiﬁcantly greater than zero at 10-percent level.
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